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THE INCONGRUOUS RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FEDERAL 
RULE OF EVIDENCE 407 AND THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF TORTS PRODUCTS LIABILITY ELEMENTS OF PROOF 
ARTHUR BEST 
W. MATTHEW PIERCE 
This essay explores an important issue in product-liability design-
defect cases: proof of a feasible alternative design. The Restatement 
(Third) of Torts
1
 requires a plaintiff to prove the existence of a feasible 
alternative design, which is a more demanding requirement than many 
states now impose. But it recommends this requirement without consid-
ering the well-known evidence rule that limits evidence of subsequent 
remedial measures. Because a defendant manufacturer’s own adoption of 
a new and safer design (a subsequent remedial measure) would be the 
most accessible and most persuasive evidence of a feasible alternative 
design, jurisdictions considering adoption of the Restatement (Third) 
requirement ought to evaluate how it relates to the evidence rule about 
subsequent remedial measures. This essay offers a concise overview of 
the problem, briefly reviews proposed solutions, and suggests an addi-
tional legal tool to balance the parties’ interests. 
Section 2 of the Restatement (Third) requires a plaintiff to prove the 
existence of a feasible alternative design to establish a prima facie case in 
most design defect cases.
2
 Although the comments to § 2 state that proof 
of a feasible alternative design is not mandatory in every design defect 
case, the requirement is waived only in rare circumstances, such as when 
“the product design is manifestly unreasonable.”
3
 By requiring proof that 
was not required in other products-liability standards, the Restatement 
(Third) shifts the balance in products liability towards defendant manu-
facturers. This favorable shift towards defendant manufacturers will be 
tempered some when a plaintiff can meet the requirement by showing 
evidence of subsequent remedial measures (if the defendant has imple-
mented any). 
  
 1. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 (1998). 
 2. Id. § 2(b) (“A product: . . . (b) is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of harm 
posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alterna-
tive design by the seller or other distributor, or a predecessor in the commercial chain of distribution, 
and the omission of the alternative design renders the product not reasonably safe.”) (emphasis 
added). 
 3. Id. § 2 cmt. b. 
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Federal Rule of Evidence 407 (Rule 407) categorically bans evi-
dence of subsequent remedial measures to prove a design defect.
4
 Such 
evidence is banned on the theory that (1) behavior subsequent to an inju-
ry has low probative value about conditions prior to the injury, and (2) 
allowing subsequent-remedial-measure evidence would discourage man-
ufacturers from improving designs after injuries.
5
 The rule allows use of 
subsequent remedial measures for impeachment and to prove the feasi-
bility of precautionary measures if that is disputed,
6
 but courts commonly 
construe these circumstances narrowly or find that evidence admissible 
under the rule is still barred by Federal Rule of Evidence 403.
7
 Where a 
state bans subsequent-remedial-measure evidence and permits (but does 
not require) evidence of a feasible alternative design as a factor for 
whether a design was defective, plaintiffs are disadvantaged by being 
deprived a strong factor, but less-so than had they been required to show 
a feasible alternative design. 
A state that were to adopt the Restatement (Third) § 2 while contin-
uing to apply Rule 407 might shift the balance toward the defendants 
significantly more than the state might intend. Evidence of a defendant’s 
subsequent remedial measures is likely the strongest proof that an alter-
native design is feasible. It allows an expert’s testimony to be concrete 
instead of hypothetical, and it can save a plaintiff the large expense of 
constructing a working model to illustrate a safer design. To prove a fea-
sible alternative design without evidence of subsequent remedial 
measures, the plaintiff, who is at a severe resource disadvantage, would 
be forced to engage in an expensive battle of experts. This would involve 
either devising a different alternative design or introducing awkward 
testimony that describes the defendant’s subsequent design but somehow 
avoids stating that the defendant designed and produced it. The following 
chart illustrates the interplay between excluding and allowing evidence 







 4. FED. R. EVID. 407 (“When measures are taken that would have made an earlier injury or 
harm less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is not admissible to prove . . . a 
defect in a product or its design.”). 
 5. FED. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee notes. 
 6. Id. (“But the court may admit this evidence for another purpose, such as impeachment 
or—if disputed—proving ownership, control, or the feasibility of precautionary measures.”). 
 7. Dan M. Kahan, The Economics—Conventional, Behavioral, and Political—of ‘Subsequent 
Remedial Measures’ Evidence, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1616, 1627–28 (2010) (describing “two strate-
gies for plugging this forbidden-purpose loophole”). 
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A state may subject some plaintiffs to the harshest of these combi-
nations by just adopting the feasible alternative design requirement, even 
if it refuses to adopt the Rule 407 subsequent-remedial-measure ban, in 
circumstances where a suit is brought in or removed to federal court. 
Federal courts sitting in diversity apply state substantive law and federal 
procedural law. Although Congress described the substantive goal of 
encouraging repairs as the “more-impressive” basis of Rule 407,
8
 the 
majority of federal circuits to consider the issue have found that Rule 407 
is a procedural rule.
9
 Therefore, most product-liability cases removed to 
  
 8. FED. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee notes. 
 9. Hottle v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 47 F.3d 106, 109 (4th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he Federal Rules of 
Evidence, as validly enacted procedural rules, govern in diversity cases.”); Wood v. Morbark Indus., 
Inc., 70 F.3d 1201, 1207 (11th Cir. 1995) (“[F]ederal rules apply to procedural matters, including the 
admissibility of evidence.”); Kelly v. Crown Equip. Co., 970 F.2d 1273, 1278 (3d Cir. 1992) (noting 
that Rule 407 is “arguably procedural” so it pre-empts conflicting state law); Flaminio v. Honda 
Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463, 471 (7th Cir. 1984) (explaining that Rule 407 governs because substantive 
aspects of the rule are intertwined with procedural concerns); Grenada Steel Indus., Inc. v. Alabama 
Oxygen Co., 695 F.2d 883, 885 (5th Cir. 1983) (applying Rule 407 because “[i]n matters of proce-
dure, however, such as the admissibility of evidence, federal rules apply.”); Rioux v. Daniel Int’l 
Corp., 582 F. Supp 620, 624 (D. Me. 1984) (explaining that to apply the state rule rather than Rule 
407, it would have “to hold that the Federal Rule exceeds the power of Congress to promulgate it 
because it cannot ‘rationally’ be classified as procedural,” while noting that “no federal rule of 
procedure or evidence has ever been struck down as exceeding Congress’ constitutional power”); see 
also Rosa v. Taser Int'l, Inc., 684 F.3d 941, 948 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Flaminio with approval); 
Legg v. Chopra, 286 F.3d 286, 289 (6th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he Federal Rules of Evidence, rather than 
state evidentiary laws, are held to apply in federal diversity proceedings.”); McInnis v. A.M.F., Inc., 
765 F.2d 240, 246 n.8 (1st Cir. 1985) (stating Congress intended the evidence rules to apply in 
diversity but noting “the 407 type rule arguably reflects a substantive policy to encourage remedial 
measures”). But see Monger v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 812 F.2d 402, 408 n.8 (8th Cir. 1987) (unclear 
whether federal or state law should govern the admissibility of subsequent remedial measures). 
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federal court from a state with the feasible alternative design requirement 
will subject plaintiffs to this quandary. 
Commentators have suggested several solutions to the problem. One 
proposes maintaining the ban for negligence actions but allowing subse-
quent remedial measures for product-liability suits, based on the theory 
from Ault10 that product manufacturers will make repairs out of econom-
ic self-interest regardless of the trial consequences.
11
 Another proposes 
that the outlying approach of categorically allowing substantive remedial 
measures even in the context of negligence (adopted in Rhode Island) 
could be preferable, expanding on Ault’s theory because of the increas-
ingly blurred line between products liability and negligence.
12
 After a 
comprehensive policy analysis, Professor Dan Kahan proposes “selective 
exclusion” of subsequent-remedial-measure evidence, allowing it only in 
otherwise close cases where its probative value is highest.
13
 
Striking the proper policy balance might be aided in some situations 
by allowing subsequent remedial measures in a redacted form as proof of 
a feasible alternative design. The plaintiff could be allowed to prove that 
an unidentified manufacturer has actually developed an alternative de-
sign and has actually marketed it. Instead of an academic expert’s theo-
retical alternative, the jury would learn that a real company has devel-




States considering modifications of either their evidentiary approach 
to subsequent remedial measures or their products liability law should be 
conscious of the interplay between the two. They would do well to re-
member the role of the Federal Rules of Evidence in diversity suits. At 
stake is the risk of inadvertently intensifying the somewhat pro-
defendant aspects of the Restatement (Third) by adopting the Restate-
ment’s demanding position on proof of a feasible alternative design but 
failing to consider how evidence rules may impair use of the clearest and 
most readily available evidence on that point. 
 
  
 10. Ault v. International Harvester Co., 528 P.2d 1148, 1151–52 (Cal. 1974) (In “the modern 
products liability field, . . . the ‘public policy’ assumptions justifying [Rule 407] are no longer val-
id.”). 
 11. See Laura B. Grubbs, Note, Something’s Gotta Give: The Conflict Between Evidence Rule 
407 and the Feasible Alternative Design Requirement, 45 BRANDEIS L.J. 781 (2007). 
 12. See Brian Fielding, Note, Rhode Island’s 407 Subsequent Remedial Measure Exception: 
Why It Informs What Goes Around Comes Around in Restatements (Second) & (Third) of Torts, and 
a Modest Proposal, 14 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 298 (2009).  
 13. See Kahan, supra note 7, at 1638–39. Kahan’s article discusses Rule 407 but not the 
Restatement (Third), yet his proposal would mitigate the problem of their interplay. 
 14. Redaction might not always be feasible. For instance, a product may be too recognizable 
for its source to be effectively concealed. 
